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Article definition:
Adaptive resonance  theory, or ART, is a cognitive  and  neural theory about  how the brain
develops  and learns  to recognize  and recall objects and events throughout  life.  ART
shows how processes  of learning, categorization, expectation, attention, resonance,
synchronization,  and memory search  interact  to enable  the brain to learn quickly and  to
retain its memories  stably, while explaining many data about perception, cognition,
learning  memory,  and  consciousness  along  the  way.
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Introduction3
I patterns of activation across  a large number  of feature-sensitive  nerve cells, or neurons.  The
same  is true for senses  other  than  vision, such  as  audition.  If the sound  of the word GO is altered
by clipping off the vowel 0, then  the consonant  G may  sound  like a chirp, quite unlike its sound
as  part of GO.
During vision, all the signals  from a scene  typically reach  the photosensitive  retinas  of the eyes
at essentially  the same  time, so parallel processing  of all the scene's  parts begins at the retina
itself. During audition, each  successive  sound  reaches  the ear at a later time. Before an entire
pattern  of sounds,  such  as  the word GO, can  be processed  as  a whol~, it needs  to be recoded,  at a
later processing  stage,  into a simultaneously  available spatial pattern of activation. Such a
processing  stage  is often called a working memory,  and  the activations that it stores  are often
called short term memory (STM) traces.  For example,  when you hear an unfamiliar telephone
number, you can temporarily  store it in working memory  while you walk over to the telephone
and dial the number.
In order to determine  which of these  patterns  represents  familiar events  and which do not, the
brain matches  these  patterns against  stored  representations  of previous experiences  that have
been  acquired  through  learning.  Unlike the STM traces  that  are  stored  in a working memory,  the
learned experiences  are stored in long term memory (L  TM) traces.  One difference  between
STM and LTM traces  concerns  how they  react  to distractions.  For example,  if you are  distracted
by a loud noise  before you dial a new  telephone  number,  its STM representation  can  be rapidly
reset so that you forget it.  On the other hand, if  you are distracted by a loud noise, you
(hopefully)  will  not forget  the LTM representation  of your own  name.
,  How  does learning of new infonnation  get stably stored in LTM?  For example, after seeing an
exciting  movie just once, we can tell  our friends many details about it later on, even though the
individual  scenes flashed by  very  quickly.  More  generally, we  can quickly  learn about new
environments, even if no one tells us how the rules of each environment differ.  To a surprising
degree, we  can rapidly  learn new facts without  being forced to just as rapidly  forget what we
already know.  As a result, we do not need to avoid going out into the world  for  fear that,  in
learning  to recognize a new friend's  face, we will  suddenly forget  our parents' faces. This  is
sometimes called the problem of catastrophic  forgetting.
Many  contemporary learning  algorithms  can  forget catastrophically.  In contrast, the brain is
capable of rapid  yet stable autonomous learning of huge amounts of data in  an ever-changing
world.  Discovering  the brain's  solution to this  key problem is as important  for understanding
ourselves  as  it  is  for  developing  new  pattern  recognition  and  prediction  applications  in
technology.
I have called the problem  whereby  the brain learns  quickly and stably  without catastrophically
forgetting its past  knowledge  the stability-plasticity  dilemma. The stability-plasticity dilemma
must  be solved  by every  brain system  that  needs  to rapidly and  adaptively  respond  to the flood of
signals that subserves  even  the most ordinary  experiences.  If the brain's  design  is parsimonious,
then  we should  expect  to fmd similar design  principles  operating  in all the brain systems  that can
stably learn  an  accumulating  knowledge  base  in response  to changing  conditions  throughout  life.
The discovery  of  such  principles should also clarify how the brain unifies diverse sources  of
information  into coherent  moments  of conscious  experience.4
The link between  learning, expectation,  attention, and resonance
Humans  are intentional beings who learn expectation  about the world and make predictions
about what is about to happen.  Humans are also attentional  beings who focus processing
resources  upon a restricted amount  of incoming information at any time. Why are we both
intentional and attentional  beings,  and are these  two types  of processes  related?  The stability-
plasticity dilemma and its solution using resonant  states  provides a unifying  framework for
understanding  these  issues.
To fix ideas about how we use a sensory  or cognitive expectation,  and how a resonant  state  is
activated,  suppose  you were asked  to "find the yellow ball within one-half  second,  and you will
win a $10,000  prize". Activating an expectation  of "yellow balls" enables  more rapid detection
of a yellow ball, and with a more energetic  neural  response,  than if you were not looking for it.
Sensory and cognitive  top-down expectations hereby lead to  excitatory  matching with
confirmatory  bottom-up  data.  On the other  hand, mismatch  between  top-down expectations  and
bottom-up  data can suppress  the mismatched  part of the bottom-up data, and thereby start to
focus  attention  upon  the matched,  or expected,  part of the bottom-up  data.
This sort of excitatory matching and attentional focusing on bottom-up data using top-down
expectations  is proposed  to generate  resonant  brain states:  When  there is a good enough  match
between  bottom-up  and  top-down  signal  patterns  between  two or more levels  of processing,  their
positive feedback  signals  amplify and  prolong  their mutual  activation,  leading  to a resonant  state.
The amplification and prolongation of the system's fast activations is sufficient to trigger
learning  in the more slowly varying adaptive  weights  that  control  the signal flow along  pathways
from cell to cell. Resonance  hereby  provides  a global context-sensitive  indicator that  the system
is processing  data  worthy of leaming. That is why the theory which describes  these  processes  is
called  Adaptive  Resonance  Theory,  or ART.
ART thus predicts that there is an intimate connection between the mechanisms which enable us
to learn quickly  and stably about a changing world,  and the mechanisms that enable us to learn
expectations about such a world,  test hypotheses about it, and focus attention upon information
that we  find  interesting.  ART  also proposes that,  in  order to  solve  the  stability-plasticity
dilemma, only resonant states  can drive rapid new learning, which gives the theory its name.
Learning within the sensory  and cognitive domain is often match learning. Match learning
occurs only if a good enough  match  occurs  between  bottom-up  information and a learned  top-
down expectation  that is read out by an active recognition category, or code. When such an
approximate  match  occurs,  previously  learned  knowledge  can  be refined. If novel information
cannot  form a good enough  match  with the expectations  that are read-out  by previously  learned
recognition categories,  then a memory  search,  or hypothesis  testing, is triggered that leads  to
selection  and  learning  of a new recognition  category,  rather  than  catastrophic  forgetting  of an  old
one.  Figure 1 illustrates  how this happens  in an ART model; it will be discussed  in greater  detail
below. In contrast, learning within spatial and motor processes  is proposed  to be mismatch
learning that  continuously updates sensory-motor maps or the  gains of  sensory-motor
commands.  As a result, we can stably learn what is happening  in a changing  world, thereby
solving the stability-plasticity  dilemma,  while adaptively  updating our representations  of where5
objects are and how to act upon them using bodies whose parameters  change continuously
through  time.
It has been  mathematically  proved that match learning within an ART model leads  to stable
memories  in response  to arbitrary list of events  to be learned  (Carpenter  and Grossberg,  1991).
Match  learning  also  has  a serious  potential  weakness,  however:  If you can only learn  when  there
is a good enough  match  between  bottom-up  data  and learned  top-down  expectations,  then how
do you ever learn  anything that you do not already  know? ART proposes  that this problem is
solved by the brain by using another  complementary  interaction,  this one between  processes  of
resonance  and reset,  that are predicted  to control properties  of attention  and memory search,
respectively. These complementary processes help  our brains to  balance between the
complementary  demands  of processing  the familiar and the unfamiliar, the expected  and the
unexpected.  One of these complementary  processes  is predicted to take place in the What
cortical stream,  notably in the visual, inferotemporal, and  prefrontal  cortex. It is here that top-
down expectations  are matched  against  bottom-up  inputs (Chelazzi,  et al., 1998; Miller  et ai,
1996).  When  a top-down expectation  achieves  a good enough  match  with bottom-up  data,  this
match process  focuses attention upon those feature clusters in the bottom-up input that are
expected.  If  the expectation  is close enough  to the input pattern, then a state of  resonance
develops  as  the attentional  focus  takes  hold.
-
-
Figure 1 illustrates  these ART  ideas in a simple two-level  example. Here, a bottom-up  input
pattern, or vector, I activates a pattern X of activity  across the feature detectors of the first level
F].  For example, a visual scene may be represented by the features comprising its boundary and
surface representations. This  feature  pattern represents the relative  importance  of  different
features in the inputs pattern I.  In Figure lA,  the pattern peaks represent  more activated feature
detector cells, the troughs less activated feature detectors. This feature pattern sends signals S
through an adaptive filter  to the second level F  2 at which a compressed representation Y (also
called a recognition category, or a symbol) is activated in response to the distributed  input  T.
Input T is computed by multiplying  the signal vector S by a matrix of adaptive weights that can
be altered through learning.  The  representation Y is compressed by competitive  interactions
across F  2 that allow  only a small subset  of its most strongly activated cells to remain active  in
response  to T. The pattern Y in the figure indicates that a small number of category cells may be
activated to different degrees. These category cells, in turn, send top-down signals U to F]. The
vector U is converted into the top-down expectation V by being multiplied  by another matrix of
adaptive weights. When V is received by F],  a matching process takes place between the input
vector I and V which selects that subset  X*  of  F] features that were "expected" by the active F  2
category Y. The set of these selected  features is the emerging "attentional focus". I
Reconciling distributed and symbolic representations  using resonance
If the top-down expectation is close enough to the bottom-up input pattern, then the pattern  X*  of
attended features reactivates the category Y which,  in turn, reactivates X*.  The network  hereby
locks into a resonant state through a positive  feedback loop that dynamically links,  or binds, the
attended  features across  X*  with their category, or symbol, Y.6
The indiVidual features at F  1 have no meaning on their own, just like the pixels  in a picture are
meaningless one-by-one. The category, or symbol, in F  2 is sensitive to the global patterning of
these features, but it cannot represent  the "contents" of the experience, including  their conscious
qualia, due to the very fact that a category is a compressed, or "symbolic"  representation. It has
often  been erroneously claimed  that a single  system is doomed to  either process distributedI
I
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features or symbolic representations,  but not both. This is not true in ART. The  resonance
between  these  two types  of information  converts  the  pattern of attended  features  into a coherent
context-sensitive  state  that  is linked to its category  through  feedback.  It is this coherent  state,  that
joins together  distributed  features  and symbolic categories,  that can enter  consciousness.  ART
predicts that all conscious  states are resonant  states. In particular, such a resonance  binds
spatially distributed  features  into either  a stable  equilibrium or a synchronous  oscillation. Such
synchronous oscillations  have recently attracted much interest after being  reported in
neurophysiological  experiments.  This type of oscillation  was  predicted  in the 1976  articles  which
introduced  ART (see  Grossberg,  1999b).
I
Resonance  mediates  between  information processing  and learning
I
In ART,  the resonant state, rather than bottom-up activation, is predicted to drive the  learning
process. The resonant state persists long enough, and at a high enough activity level, to activate
the slower learning  processes in the adaptive weights  that guide the  flow  of signals between
bottom-up and top-down pathways between levels F J and F  2. This  viewpoint  helps to  explain
how  adaptive weights  that were changed through previous  learning  can regulate the brain's
present  information  processing,  without  learning  about the  signals  that  they  are  currently
processing unless they can initiate a resonant  state. Through resonance  as a mediating event, one
can see from  a  deeper viewpoint  why  humans are intentional  beings  who  are continually
predicting  what may next occur, and why we tend to learn about the events to which we pay
attention. I
How are learning  and hypothesis te:sting  related?
A sufficiently bad mismatch  between  an  active top-down  expectation  and  a bottom-up  input, say
because  the input  represents  an  unfamiliar  type of experience,  can  drive a memory  search.  Such  a
mismatch within  the attentional system  is proposed  to activate a complementary orienting
system,  which is sensitive  to unexpected  and  unfamiliar events.  ART suggests  that  this orienting
system includes the hippocampal system, which has long been known to be involved  in
mismatch  processing,  including the processing  of novel events  (e.g., Otto and Eichenbaum,
1992). Output  signals  from the orienting system  rapidly reset  the recognition category  that has
been  reading out the poorly matching top-down expectation  (Figure IB and lC). The cause  of
the mismatch  is hereby  removed,  thereby  freeing the system  to activate a different recognition
category  (Figure 1  d). The reset event hereby  triggers memory search,  or hypothesis  testing,
which automatically  leads  to the selection  of a recognition category  that can better match  the
input.
If no such  recognition  category  exists,  say  because  the bottom-up  input represents  a truly novel
experience,  then  the search  process  automatically  activates  an  as yet uncommitted  population  of
cells, with which to learn  about  the novel information.  This learning process  works well under
both  unsupervised  and supervised conditions (e.g., Carpenter et al.,  1994). Unsupervised
learning means  that the system  can learn how to categorize  novel input patterns  without any
external  feedback.  Supervised  learning  uses  predictive errors  to let the system  know whether  it
has  categorized  the information  correctly. Supervision  can  force a search  for new  categories  that
may be culturally determined,  and are not based on feature similarity alone. For example,
separating  the letters  E and F into separate  recognition  categories  is culturally determined;  they
I8
are quite similar based  on visual similarity alone.  If  the input pattern directly represented  the
pixels of E and F (which it, in general,  would not), then  both E and F might be classified in the
same  category  with the category  prototype  ofE, unless  supervised  feedback  indicated  that E is an
incorrect  response  when F is the correct  answer.  Such  error-based  feedback  enables  variants  of E
and F to  learn their own category and category prototype. Taken together, the interacting
processes  of attentive-learning  and orienting-search  hereby  realize a type of error correction
through hypothesis  testing that can build an ever-growing, self-rerming internal model of a
changing  world.
How is the generality of knowledge  controlled? Exemplars and prototypes
A key problem  about  cognition  concerns  what combinations  of features  or other information  are
bound together  into object or event  representations.  In particular, it is tempting to believe that
exemplars, or individual  experiences,  are learned because  humans can have very specific
memories.  For example,  we can easily  recognize  the faces  of each  of our friends. On the other
hand, storing every remembered  experiences  as exemplars can easily lead to a formidable
combinatorial explosion  of memory, as well as to difficult problems of memory retrieval. In
addition, it is clear that we are also able to learn prototypes that can represent  quite general
properties  of the environment  (posner  and Keele, 1970). For example,  we can recognize that
everyone  has  a face.  But then  how do we learn  specific  episodic  memories?  ART provides  a new
answer  to this question  that  overcomes  problems  faced  by earlier  models.
ART  systems learn prototypes,  but the generality of  these prototypes  can be controlled  by a
process of  vigilance  which  can be influenced  by environmental  feedback or internal  volition
(Carpenter and Grossberg,  1991; Grossberg, 1999b). Low  vigilance  permits  the learning  of
general categories with  abstract  prototypes. High vigilance forces a memory search  to occur for a
new category when even small mismatches exist between an exemplar and the category that it
activates. As  a result,  in the  limit  of  high  vigilance,  the  category prototype  may encode an
individual  exemplar. Vigilance  is  computed  within  the orienting  system of  an ART  model
(Figures  IB-D).  It  is here that bottom-up  excitation  from  all  the active  features in  an input
pattern  I  are compared  with  inhibition  from  all  the  active  features  in  a distributed  feature
representation across F J. If  the ratio of the total  activity  across the active features in F J (that is,
the "matched"  features) to the total  activity  due to all the features in I is less than a vigilance
parameter  p (Figure 1B), then a reset wave is activated (Figure  1C), which can drive the search
for another category with which to classify the exemplar. In other words, the vigilance  parameter
controls how bad a match can be before search for a new category is initiated.  If  the vigilance
parameter is low,  then many exemplars can all influence the learning of a shared prototype,  by
chipping  away at the features which  are not in common to all  the exemplars. If  the vigilance
parameter  is high, then even a small difference between a new exemplar and a known prototype
(e.g., F vs. E) can drive the search  for a new category with which to represent  F.
The simplest rule for controlling  vigilance is called match tracking. Here a predictive  error (e.g.,
E is predicted in response  to F), the vigilance  parameter increases  until  it is just higher than the
ratio of active features in F  1 to total features in I. In other words, vigilance "tracks"  the degree of
match between input exemplar and matched prototype. This is the minimal  level of vigilance  that
can trigger a reset wave and thus a memory search for a new category. It has been shown that
match tracking realizes a Minimax  Learning Rule that conjointly  maximizes category generality9
while  it  minimizes  predictive  error.  In  other words,  match tracking  uses the  least memory
resources that can prevent errors from being made.
Because  vigilance can vary across  learning trials, recognition  categories  capable  of encoding
widely differing degrees  of generaliza1:ion  or abstraction  can  be learned  by a single  ART system.
Low vigilance leads  to broad generalization  and abstract  prototypes.  High vigilance leads  to
narrow generalization  and to prototypes that represent  fewer input exemplars,  even  a single
exemplar.  Thus a single ART system  may  be used,  say,  to learn abstract  prototypes  with which
to recognize  abstract  categories  of faces  and  dogs,  as  well as "exemplar  prototypes"  with which
to recognize  individual faces and dogs. ART models hereby try to learn the most general
category  that is consistent  with the data. This tendency  can, for example,  lead to the type of
overgeneralization  that is  seen in young children until  further learning leads to  category
refmement.  Many benchmark  studies  of how ART uses  vigilance control to classify complex
data  bases  have shown  that the number  of ART categories  that is learned  scales  well with the
complexity of the input data; see Carpenter  and Grossberg  (1994) for illustrative benchmark
studies.
Memory consolidation  and the emergence  of rules
As sequences  of inputs are practiced over learning trials, the search  process eventually converges
upon stable categories. It has been mathematically proved (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1987a) that
familiar  inputs directly  access the category whose prototype provides the globally  best match,
while  unfamiliar  inputs engage the orienting  subsystem to trigger  memory searches for  better
categories until  they become familiar.  This process continues until the memory capacity, which
can be chosen arbitrarily  large, is fully  utilized.  The process whereby search is automatically
disengaged  is  a  form  of  memory  consolidation  that  emerges  from  network  interactions.
Emergent consolidation does not preclude structural consolidation at individual  cells, since the
amplified  and prolonged  activities  that subserve a resonance may be a trigger  for  learning-
dependent cellula{  processes, such as protein synthesis and transmitter production.  It has also
been shown that the adaptive weights which are learned by some ART models can, at any stage
ofleaming,  be translated into  IF-THEN  rules (e.g.,  Carpenter and Grossberg, 1994). Thus the
ART model is a self-organizing rule-discovering  production system as well as a neural network.
These examples show that the claims of some cognitive scientists and AI  practioners that neural
network models cannot learn rule-based behaviors are incorrect.
Corticohippocampal interactions and medial temporal amnesia
As  noted above, the attentional subsystem  of  ART  has been used to  model aspects of
inferotemporal  (IT) cortex,  and  the orienting subsystem  models  part  of the hippocampal  system.
The interpretation  of ART dynamics  in terms  of IT cortex  led Miller, Li, and  Desimone  (1991)  to
successfully  test the prediction that cells in monkey IT cortex are reset after each  trial  in a
working memory  task.  To illustrate  the implications  of an ART interpretation  of IT  -hippocampal
interactions,  I will  review how a lesion  of the ART model's  orienting subsystem  creates  a formal
memory disorder with symptoms much like the medial temporal amnesia  that is caused  in
animals  and human  patients  after  hippocampal  system  lesions.  In particular,  such  a lesion  in vivo
causes  unlimited anterograde  amnesia;  limited retrograde  amnesia;  failure of consolidation;
tendency to  learn the  first  event in  a series; abnormal reactions to  novelty,  including10
perseverative  reactions;  normal priming; and  normal information  processing  of familiar events.
Unlimited anterograde  amnesia  occurs  because  the network  cannot  carry out the memory  search
to learn a new recognition  code.  Limited retrograde  amnesia  occurs  because  familiar events  can
directly access  correct  recognition  codes.  Before events  become  familiar, memory  consolidation
occurs which utilizes the orienting subsystem  (Figure I C).  This failure of consolidation  does
not necessarily  prevent  learning  per se. Instead,  it is predicted  to learn coarser  categories  due  to
the failure  of  vigilance control and memory search. For the same reason, learning may
differentially influence  the first recognition  category  activated  by bottom-up  processing,  much  as
amnesics  are particularly strongly wedded to the first response  they learn.  Perseverative
reactions  can occur  because  the orienting subsystem  cannot  reset sensory  representations  or top-
down expectations  that may be persistently  mismatched  by bottom-up cues. The inability to
search memory prevents ART from discovering more appropriate'stimulus combinations  to
attend. Normal priming occurs  because  it is mediated  by the attentional  subsystem.  Data which
support  these  predictions  are summarized  in Grossberg  and Merrill  (1996), who also note that
these  are not the only problems  that can  be caused  by such  a lesion  due  to the predicted  role of
hippocampal  structures  in learned  spatial  navigation  and  adaptive  timing functions.
Knowlton and Squire (1993)  have reported  that amnesics  can classify items as members  of a
large category  even  if  they are impaired on remembering  the individual items themselves.  To
account  for these  results,  the authors  proposed  that item and category  memories  are formed by
distinct brain systems.  Grossberg  and  Merrill (1996)  suggested  that their data  could  be explained
by a single ART system  in which the absence  of vigilance  control caused  only coarse  categories
to form. Recently, Nosofsky and Zaki have quantitatively  simulated  the Knowlton and Squire
data  using  a single-system  model in which category  sensitivity  is low.
Cortical substrates  of ART matching
How are ART top-down matching rules implemented  in the cerebral cortex of the brain? An
answer  to this question  has  been  recently  proposed  as  part of a rapidly developing  theory  of why
the cerebral cortex is typically organized  into six distinct layers of cells (Grossberg,  I 999a).
Earlier mathematical work had predicted that such a matching rule would be realized by a
modulatory top-down  on-center off-surround network (e.g., Carpenter  and Grossberg, 1991;
Grossberg,  1999b).  Figure  2 shows  how such  a matching  circuit may  be realized  in the cortex.  In
Figure 2, the top-down  circuit generates  outputs  from cortical layer  6 of V2 that activate  layer 6
of  VI  via the vertical pathway between  these layers that ends in  an open triangle (which
designates  an excitatory  connection).  Cells in layer 6 of VI,  in turn, activate  an "on-center  off-
surround"  circuit to layer  4 of VI.  In this circuit, an excitatory  cell (open  circle) in layer  6 excites
the excitatory cell (open  circle) immediately  above  it in layer 4 via the vertical pathway from
layer 6 to 4 that ends  in an open  triangle.  This excitatory  interaction  constitutes  the "on-center".
The same excitatory cell in layer 6 also excites nearby inhibitory cells (closed black circles)
which, in turn, inhibit cells in layer  4. This spatially  distributed inhibition constitutes  the "off-
surround" of the layer 6 cell. The on-center  is predicted  to have a modulatory, or sensitizing,
effect on layer  4, due  to the  balancing  of excitatory  and inhibitory inputs  to layer  4 within the on-
center. The inhibitory  signals in the off-surround can strongly suppress  unattended  visual
features.  This arrangement  clarifies how top-down  attention  can  sensitize  the brain to get ready
for expected information that mayor  may not actually occur, without  actively firing  the
sensitized  target cells and thereby  inadvertently  creating  hallucinations that the information is11
already  there.  When  this balance  breaks  down,  hallucinations  may, indeed,  occur  that  have  many
of the  properties  reported  by schizophrenic  patients.
Figure 2. The  LAMINART  model:
The  model  is  a  synthesis  of
feedforward (or bottom-up), feedback
(or  top-down),  and  horizontal
interactions within  and between the
lateral geniculate  nucleus (LGN) and
visual cortical areas  VI  and  V2. Cells
and connections with  open symbols
indicate excitatory interactions, and
closed symbols  indicate  inhibitory
interactions. The stippled  top-down
connections  indicate  attentional
feedback.  See  Grossberg  (1999a)  and
Grossberg and Raizada (2000)  for
further  discussion  of how these  circuits
work. [Adapted with permission  from
Grossberg  and  Raizada  (2000).]
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